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A number of incentive-compliance classification systems have been developed to
explain differences in the power and hold of organizations in relation to their mem-
bers. Terms such as "coercive," "normative," "purposive," "solidary," and "material
incentive" are used to describe the incentive-compliance base.
These classification systems partially overlap and use terms in different ways.
A set of dimensions is introduced to substruct the property space of incentives.
Related to the economic conception of utility, the dimensions are negative and
positive utility, probability of delivery, transferability, and collective goods. The
property space includes most of the prior classifications as specific types. Finally,
we introduce power-dependence concepts as an explanatory mechanism.
A number of crude classifications have been developed to
describe basic differences in the incentives employed by
organizations to induce behavior and attitudes. The range is
quite extensive. For example, Gordon and Babchuk (1959)
employ the terms &dquo;instrumental&dquo; versus &dquo;expressive&dquo; to
characterize voluntary associations, while Etzioni (1961)
uses &dquo;coercive,&dquo; &dquo;utilitarian,&dquo; and &dquo;normative&dquo; to identify
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organizational compliance systems. Clark and Wilson ( 1961 ),
following Barnard (1938), employ yet another set of concepts
when they discuss &dquo;material,&dquo; &dquo;purposive,&dquo; and &dquo;solidary
incentives.&dquo; Warriner (1965) adds &dquo;performance-pleasure,&dquo;
&dquo;sociability,&dquo; &dquo;symbolic,&dquo; and &dquo;productive assumed value
functions&dquo; to this inventory. Moreover, these typologies
overlap psychological classifications, such as Kelman’s ( 1958)
processes of influence: &dquo;compliance,&dquo; &dquo;identification,&dquo; and
&dquo;internalization.&dquo;
Organizations need not rely on just one kind of incentive.
For instance, an organization may mix coercive and normative
compliance systems. Nevertheless, for comparative purposes
they are often categorized by the dominant incentive. In each
case the classification is used to explain some gross differences
in organizational structure, leadership behavior, leader-
member relations, membership commitment, or the like.
Without these classifications, research and thinking about
organizations in the last fifteen years would have been much
impoverished. For instance, all of the following works are
related to compliance-incentive notions: Wilson’s work on
political organizations (1962, 1973); Zald and Ash’s discussion
of social movement organizations (1966); Warriner’s (1965)
and Warriner and Prather’s (1965) research on voluntary
associations; Oberschall’s (1973) discussion of the social
control of social movements; Hofstetter’s ( 1973) and Conway
and Feigert’s (1968) work on political party participation;
Bailis ( 1974) on the welfare rights movement in Massachusetts.
Etzioni’s (1975) massive summary of research on his classi-
fication scheme alone indicates how influential his ideas
have been. As heuristic classifications, this work has been
invaluable.
Nevertheless, the fact that these classifications only partially
overlap and that they sometimes use similar words for
organizations that employ quite different incentives is con-
fusing and uneconomical. It also suggests that the authors are
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leaving out salient dimensions or making implicit simplifying
assumptions.
The purpose of this paper is to present a property space
(Lazarsfeld, 1937) of underlying dimensions of organizational
incentives that contain the classifications as type concepts
(i.e., labels for specific combinations of dimensions). If fully
successful, this substruction of the property space will show
the relation of these classifications to each other, identify
types not contained or discussed in the prior classifications,
and lead to a more refined and precise language for discussing
incentives. Even if only partially successful, the substruction
exercise will expose problems in the use of incentive concepts
and suggest issues that must be taken into account in further
theorizing. The underlying dimensions of this property space
are specifications of the factors that affect utility. Our basic
property space uses economic language to describe the
dimensions of incentives which various organizations deliver.
Finally, after presenting the property space, we will show
how power-dependence analysis drawn from social psychol-
ogy provides explanatory mechanisms for incentive theory.
Before turning to the dimensions of the property space, let
us elaborate on our claim that the various classification
systems do in fact partially overlap and that their languages
are sometimes contradictory and ambiguous.
OVERLAP AND AMBIGUITIES IN CLASSIFICATION
The most widely used of all of these classification systems
are those of Clark and Wilson ( 1961 ) and Etzioni (1961).
Etzioni’s &dquo;utilitarian&dquo; and Clark and Wilson’s &dquo;material&dquo;
are the same, although Etzioni is interested in utilitarian
remunerative organizations, whereas Clark and Wilson are
interested in material voluntary associations. (The difference
between the two is that salary and wages are believed to be
constantly necessary, and therefore &dquo;involuntary,&dquo; while
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voluntary associations offer marginal, though concrete,
incentives.) There is no parallel to Etzioni’s coercive category
in Clark and Wilson’s schema. Etzioni lumps under one
category, &dquo;normative,&dquo; what Clark and Wilson divide into
two, &dquo;solidary&dquo; and &dquo;purposive.&dquo; However, at points Etzioni
divides this normative category into &dquo;pure normative&dquo; and
&dquo;social power.&dquo;’ Other examples of overlap can be given. It
would appear that Gordon and Babchuk’s (1959) &dquo;instru-
mental&dquo; category overlaps Clark and Wilson’s &dquo;material
incentives&dquo; and Etzioni’s &dquo;utilitarian.&dquo; However, in terms
of the actual assignment of specific organizations to the class,
Gordon and Babchuk’s &dquo;instrumental&dquo; is really the same as
&dquo;purposive&dquo; or &dquo;normative-based&dquo; organizations, e.g., the
NAACP. Gordon and Babchuk’s &dquo;expressive&dquo; category
overlaps Clark and Wilson’s &dquo;solidary&dquo; category and also
Warriner’s (1965) &dquo;performance pleasure&dquo; and &dquo;symbolic&dquo;
categories.
Not only do these classification systems overlap, but they
sometimes have ambiguous meanings and unclear referents.
Wilson’s work is more carefully done and extensive than most
efforts in this area. Nevertheless, even his work has ambigui-
ties. Take the category of organizations employing material
incentives. The archetype is the business firm, paying wages
and salaries. But because Wilson is largely interested in
political associations and voluntary associations that may
have political impact, he excludes businesses from analysis.
So he turns to political machines that depend on patronage,
wages, and salaries from government jobs. But he does not
face the issue of whether these machines can be considered
voluntary associations. As a result, he must lump taxpayer
associations in the same incentive category with political
machines. However, it would appear that the former offer a
promise of material incentives, but the latter are dependent
upon immediate patronage!
There are other ambiguities and partial overlaps in these
classification systems, but little scholarly benefit would come
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from continued exposition. Only an encompassing framework
would parsimoniously clarify the similarities and differences
in these classifications.
THE ORGANIZATIONAL DELIVERY OF UTILITY:
COMPONENTS OF A PROPERTY SPACE2
An organizational sanction or incentive is a reward or
deprivation given (or promised-threatened) for participation
in organizations and for compliance with organizational
norms and behavioral expectations. The reward or depri-
vation accompanies participation. However, organizational
staff need not intend to reward. Thus, ideological activists
are rewarded by the mere act of working toward the values
they have internalized, not necessarily by conscious dis-
tribution of incentives by executives. Physical punishment,
social status, social relations with like-minded people, and
the potential perfection of the world are examples of other
sanctions that can operate to induce behavior.
How can we compare these discrete incentives? They have
in common a utility or disutility and they are delivered by
organizations. We assert that there is a systematic set of
dimensions related to utility delivery by which concrete
incentives can be compared and contrasted. In other words,
we believe that by using the idea of utility together with
dimensions familiar to students of exchange, we can isolate
salient dimensions for comparing and contrasting organ-
izational incentives.
Stated somewhat differently, incentives are values de-
livered. For comparing and contrasting organizational
incentives, we need a set of dimensions of value and of the
conditions for transferring value. Just as money, as a medium
of exchange, has characteristics that separate it from other
media of exchange (e.g., gold, letters of credit, promissory
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notes, bushels of wheat), so do various incentives have
differential characteristics.3
Four dimensions of utility and its delivery are included
in our property space: ( 1 ) the direction of utility-negative
or positive value of the sanction; (2) expected utility-the
probability that an incentive will be forthcoming; (3) trans-
ferability-the extent to which the reward or punishment is
fungible (that is, the extent to which incentives can be traded
for other utilities or are intrinsic to the reward or punishment);
(4) collective goods-the extent to which the incentive must
be supplied to every member of a society, community, or
group, or is supplied (internalized) to individuals. Let us
discuss these dimensions, showing how each helps clarify one
aspect or another of incentive classifications.
NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE UTILITIES
Organizational incentives or sanctions are the actual or
promised (threatened) delivery of positive or negative utilities.
A good, service, or situation can be said to have positive
utility if people will assume costs to attain them. They have
disutility if people will assume costs to avoid them.
Since incentives include promises and threats, we must
ask if nonfulfillment of a promise is the same as a negative
incentive. The answer to this question evidently depends on
expectations. Baldwin (1971: 23-24) has taught us that in
discussing negative and positive sanctions we must establish
&dquo;B’s baseline of expectations at the moment A’s influence
attempt begins. This baseline is defined by B’s expected
future value position, i.e., his expectation about his future
position relative to the things he values. Positive sanctions,
then, are actual or promised improvements in B’s value
position relative to his baseline of expectation. Negative
sanctions are actual or threatened deprivations relative
to this same baseline.&dquo;4 Thus, once a promise becomes part
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of the baseline of expectations, nonfulfillment becomes a
deprivation.
Use of the notion of disutility allows us to clarify the
concept of coercive incentives and coercive organizations. In
common usage coercion has at least two meanings, the in-
flictions of unacceptable physical punishment and the denial
of freedom to cross the boundary of the organizations. Denial
of freedom to cross the boundary of organization can be defined
as the imposition of unacceptable disutility when attempts are
made to cross the boundary. The prison (through electric
fences or armed guards), the isolated prisoner island (through
risk of death in the sea), or institutions of slavery (through
fugitive slave laws) all impose high costs if attempts are made
to leave the organization.5
Note, however, that unacceptable boundary costs do not
necessarily relate to the imposition of physical sanctions
or other extreme disutilities within the boundaries of the
organization. An organization could be fully coercive at
the boundary (certain imposition of unacceptable disutilities),
and rely upon other incentives within. Prisoner-of-war camps,
&dquo;con-joints&dquo; and Skinnerian rehabilitation centers may
operate on such systems.
It should be noted that any organization that is a monop-
oly provider of high-utility goods or services is &dquo;coercive&dquo;
at the boundary. That is, leaving has extreme disutility. Social
movement organizations, religious sects, or even businesses
may be coercive for their members if exclusion from them
would impose unacceptable costs. In the case of social
movement organizations and religious sects, one might
speak of coercion when such organizations monopolize highly
desired ends-when participation and conformity is perceived




Incentives are promised for delivery over time. Organ-
izations &dquo;contract&dquo; to reward or punish for participation.
Because of past performance and future prospects, organ-
izations develop expected delivery rates. Some organizations
deliver daily, or weekly, or they write contingency contracts.
Other organizations make promises with very low probability
of deliveries (e.g., &dquo;Join us to get to the kingdom of heaven,&dquo;
or &dquo;Work hard and you’ll become a movie star&dquo;). One major
difference between external instrumental voluntary associa-
tions and remunerative or utilitarian organizations is that
remunerative organizations typically have a high probability
of payoff, while external instrumental voluntary associations
have a lower probability of payoff. They promise payoffs in
the future.
Examples of voluntary associations that are externally
instrumental are pressure groups and trade associations. Their
incentive systems are called external here because the utilities
they promise to deliver are controlled in the first instance
by other groups or organizations.’ It should be noted, how-
ever, that voluntary associations using internally instrumental
incentive systems have higher probabilities of payoff than
externally instrumental associations. Such voluntary associa-
tions as cooperatives and stock and commodity exchanges are
a subclass of remunerative organizations in this regard.
However, they differ in the relative control of resources
by participants. Internally instrumental voluntary associa-
tions are confederations of participants with relatively equal
control over resources, whereas remunerative organizations
corporatively control the resources.
We suspect that there is also a difference in the probabilities
of expected reward of members in different types of external
voluntary associations. Members of a trade association are
likely to have less ambiguous goals and a shorter time-horizon
than members of social movement organizations. Both have
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lower probabilities of delivery than remunerative organ-
izations, but the trade association is likely to offer greater
prospects than the social movement organization.
Finally, note that although remunerative organizations
usually promise incentives with a high probability of delivery
(e.g., there is very high probability that one will receive a
check on Friday), sometimes they do not. First, where the
industry or economy is unstable, guarantees of payment
decline. Workers may have to accept scrip. As the probability
of positive payoff declines, withdrawal of participation
increases. Second, some organizations may mix high-prob-
ability payoffs with low-probability ones. Thus, promises
of career advancement, bonus plans, and profit sharing plans
are usually lower-probability incentive systems.
TRANSFERABILITY
Incentives are transferable to the extent that they have
potential to create other (dis)utilities. Incentives such as
money with high transferability have extrinsic utility. In-
centives with very low transferability are those which have
only intrinsic value-the incentive is pleasant or unpleasant in
itself and has no other currency. For instance, membership
in social clubs or in avocational groups may be satisfying
in itself and may not be transferable outside. But if, as in
belonging to elite clubs, the membership also gives status or
contacts that lead to the accrual of utilities outside of the
organization, it also has some extrinsic value and can be
viewed as both a positive and a transferable incentive. On the
other hand, incentives which transfer disutilities are, in
Goffman’s word, &dquo;stigmas.&dquo; The Scarlet Letter, ex-prison
or mental hospital status, and membership in Hell’s Angels
all inflict disutilities outside of the organization in which
the incentive is accrued.
Just as with money, the transferability of other incentives
depends upon their currency, acceptability, and recognition by
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others. If their visibility can be removed, the disutility of
transferable incentives can be lowered For incentives to
be transferable they must also be storable so that utility can
be preserved. Most of the time money is a superior incentive to,
say, artwork because its value is more easily transferable
(exchanged) and its value more permanent. But in times of
inflation a given amount of money loses its value whiie the
artwork of a master increases. Organizations using negative
incentives may vary in the extent to which the incentive is
permanent. For instance, relying on the use of physical
punishment will differ in the permanence of the disutilities
inflicted. Those that maim inflict permanent utilities; those
that merely inflict pain pass an incentive that is limited to
captivity (setting aside the possibility of psychological scars).
There are three major types of positive incentives with low
transferability: ( 1 ) those in which the intrinsic satisfaction
comes from associating with the particular people in the
organization (solidary incentives); (2) those in which the
intrinsic satisfaction comes from the tasks the groups perform
(avocational groups); and (3) those in which the members
receive satisfaction from the goals the organization strives
to attain (purposive incentives). Differences among organ-
izations are reflected in the social structure of the groups,
the degree of status homogeneity, and the durability and
flexibility of each organization (see Warriner, 1965, and
Warriner and Prather, 1965). For instance, a bridge club
offering solidary incentives will recruit members from a
narrower range of social statuses than a bridge club designed
for the task of playing itself. Similarly, the social-relations-
oriented bridge club is likely to embellish the activity with
more informal activities, while the task-oriented club permits
fewer distractions.
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COLLECTIVE AND &dquo;OTHER DIRECTED&dquo; GOODS
Organization incentives also vary in whether they are
directly delivered to the individual who participates (works,
bears the costs of membership) or whether they are supplied,
regardless of their efforts. In the latter case the participant
benefits/loses from others’ efforts. To the extent that an
organization pays off by accomplishing some change in the
social structure (laws, statuses, and the like) that rewards
all members of a class, industry, or community, its payoff
is a collective good available to all. In a parallel situation
a class does not benefit but other individuals do. Thus, one
may join the Committee to Save Joan Little in order to help
women, to help blacks, to change Southern justice, or just to
help Joan Little. The utility to the actor is someone else’s
benefit or the advancement of a cause.9
Olson ( 1965) argues that organizations offering collective
goods are beset with the problem of free riders-most in-
dividuals will have little incentive to participate or bear
the costs to the organizations. The costs to the individual
will be great relative to his individual benefit, which will
come whether he participates or not. Olson argues that unless
organizations are made up of a few resource-rich participants
who can control each other and for whom costs will be small
relative to benefits, collective goods will rarely be sought
without many more immediate and selective incentives.10
To the extent, then, that organizations provide incentives
largely in the nature of promises to deliver collective goods,
they will usually have difficulty mobilizing support. And
if these are purposive social movement organizations that
promise collective goods with low probabilities of delivery,
they should have even less ability to mobilize support.
These four dimensions-direction of utility, probability
of delivery, collective goods, and transferability-comprise
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Figure 1 : Cross-Classification of Four Dichotomized Dimensions of
Incentive Systems: Types of Organizations
our underlying dimensions of a property space for incentives.
Dichotomizing each dimension into a low and high category
gives us a property space with 16 classifications.
Figure I presents this property space with examples of types
of organizations that offer incentives of a given combination
of measured positions on variables. Without reviewing all
cells, some comments are in order. Note that several of the
cells on the negative utility side are empty or have specific
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sanctions rather than organizational types assigned. Because
organizations are included within societies, and societies
rather than organizations have legitimate control of violence,
many organizations cannot employ disutilities based on
force to induce behavior. Moreover, especially in modern
societies, laws guaranteeing individual freedom prohibit
status relations like slavery, or indentured servitude that
would permit high use of negative utilities without resulting
in people leaving the organizations. We had to &dquo;stretch&dquo; to
fill in as many of the negative utility cells as we have. (The
reader is encouraged to try his own hand at filling in the cells.)
Now turn to the right-hand side of the matrix. First note
that the probability of delivery dimension allows us to
distinguish two types of remunerative organizations. Utility
of incentives being equal, the high-risk venture is likely to have
a much greater problem in mobilizing support.
Examine also the cells in the rows with collective goods.
We are able to distinguish a number of different kinds of
organizations promising collective goods which, because
they differ on other dimensions, are likely to have different
abilities to induce commitment.
Finally, examine cells in the lower right-hand quadrant.
On the one hand, a distinction is made between status confer-
ral and sociability. The former incentive can be used outside
of the group, while sociability can only be provided within
the group. On the other hand, the linking of sociability and
avocational incentives together indicates that our property
space could be made even more refined by distinguishing
between utilities gained from the interaction with organ-
izational members and utilities gained from the task over
which members interact. Adding such a dimension, however,
doubles the number of cells of the property space and in-
troduces a conceptual distinction at a lower level of abstrac-
tion.
This last point deserves amplification, for it suggests
that our property space is incomplete, that it does not include
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all theoretically relevant dimensions. Property space
construction balances two incompatible objectives-parsi-
mony and completeness. The property space presented here is
more complete than previous classifications, since it includes
them as classes of our cross-classification. But it is our
judgment that adding even more dimensions to enlarge the
property space would strain the reader’s ability to use the
system.
Addition of other dimensions can be done for specific
purposes. Our own candidates for heuristic addition are two.
First, as mentioned above, whether the utility is attached to
the task or to the social relation is important for distinguishing
among so-called solidary associations. Second, utilities are
sometimes unknown. Many incentive theorists use the concept
of tangible versus intangible. Part of the meaning of tangibility
has been taken up by using the intrinsic-transferable dimen-
sion. But another aspect of intangibility is &dquo;undefinability.&dquo;
Paralleling the concept of expectation of utility, or probability
of delivery, might be ambiguity.
Such an aspect may be especially useful in distinguishing
the incentive systems of established denominations from
religious sects, or reform from revolutionary purposive
organizations. Although both dimensions are candidates
for inclusion in our property space, at this stage their addition
would help to make for a finer-grained analysis, without
including any major new types.
STRENGTH OF INCENTIVES AND
ORGANIZATIONAL POWER
The property space we have developed is an abstract
statement of the major descriptive dimensions for comparing
and classifying the direction and delivery of utility. As such,
it does not explain why some organizations will have alienated
members, why leaders may be dependent upon followers, or
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many of the other concerns of incentive analysis. However,
analysts who use incentivelike concepts can only make pre-
dictions because they combine assumptions, often unstated or
unexplicated, about the psychological and social-psycho-
logical processes involved in motivating participation. Atten-
tion to these social-psychological assumptions will provide
explanations for variation in the strength of incentives and
the conditions for organizational power over members.
Attention to these assumptions will also help us to reduce our
property space, to explain why some of the logical possibilities
only rarely occur and why others often occur. Here, two issues
will concern us: (1) What determines the amount of utility of
different organizational incentives? (2) What are the deter-
minants of organizational power?
THE AMOUNT OF UTILITY -
Behind the economist’s generalized concept of utility
lies a variety of specific tastes. In turn, &dquo;tastes&dquo; or &dquo;pref-
erences&dquo; are shaped by physiology, culture, and psychology.
It is best to make explicit what is often left implicit. First,
the amount of utility of any single incentive depends upon
the extent to which it satisfies or can be used to satisfy these
tastes. Further, all tastes are not equal. Some tastes are related
to basic physiological needs: food, body temperature, sleep,
and avoidance of extreme pain are primary needs. In general,
though not for all people all of the time, avoidance of the
disutility of deprivation of these tastes takes precedence
over others. Secondary or higher-order needs-approval from
others, rewarding social relations, pursuit of ideals-have
lower utility when primary needs are not met or satiated
(see Maslow, 1948a and 1948b).
This obvious discussion has two immediate consequences,
also obvious, for incentive theorists. It is not the type of
incentive that creates the hold of organization over members,
but the relative amount of utility of the incentive vis-d-vis
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other incentives. The coercive organization may be powerful
for two reasons: ( 1 ) by inflicting pain or by withholding
primary physiological needs, it controls formidable utilities;
and (2) by constraining at the boundary, it controls access
to the satisfaction of all other tastes. Remunerative organ-
izations also have strong holds and can demand a great deal
of work-time commitment because the amount of money they
give is a requisite for the satisfaction of a whole host of tastes,
many of them high priority. Consider, for example, a re-
munerative organization that only paid a dollar a week and
a friendship club that gave a person a good deal of sense
of belonging. We would certainly not consider the remunera-
tive organization as stronger in its hold.
Thus, in the first instance, the power of organizations in
relationship to their members comes from the ability to control
access to important utilities. But important caveats are
necessary. First, as primary needs get satiated, higher-order
needs take on greater importance. Second, some people have
tastes for ideals that are greater than their taste for food.
Avoidance of death is not a sine qua non for all.
POWER DEPENDENCE ANALYSIS
Implicit in the discussion of coercive organizations is a
concept of power formulated in power-dependence terms (see
Emerson, 1962, or Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). Briefly, A’s
power over B is a direct function of B’s valuation of states
or objects controlled by A and an inverse function of the
number of alternative sources of supply of the valued state
or object. B’s power is reciprocally defined by his control
of valued objects for A. Emerson’s analysis leads us to
look at organizations as monopolistic or competitive sup-
pliers. His analysis is strengthened by Thibaut and Kelley’s
notion of comparison level alternatives. Their formulation
emphasizes the fact that commitment to a group or an organ-
ization is dependent not only on the amount of incentives
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offered but upon the discrepancy in utility offered in the
focal relationship as compared to tlze nearest _feasible alter-
native. Thus, maintenance of commitment depends upon
available alternatives.
An exchange perspective applies as well to organizations
that use coercive stimuli to induce effort, as long as one
remembers that coercive organizations are fully dependent
upon their ability to impose unacceptable costs at the bound-
ary. No other alternatives should be available so that the
coerced become unable to avoid negative utilities. Similarly,
organizations offering poor salaries are able to gain greater
commitment and effort if there are no alternative jobs avail-
able.
This framework also accounts for the weakness of organ-
izations like the Kiwanis or Elks. The important point to
note is these organizations are not major purveyors of
sociability, friendship, intimacy, and love. Families, kin
networks, and informal groups provide these. The ability of
families and love relationships to draw forth commitment and
effort, while variable, is clearly of an order that rivals the
strength of the most coercive of organizations. Such organ-
izations as the Elks and senior citizens clubs are likely to
have stronger holds over people who are without attachment
to family, kin, and informal friendship groups than where
these forms of sociation are available elsewhere. Analysis of
incentives without analysis of alternatives of supply is likely to
lead to a partial analysis of the strength of incentives.
This relationship between the strength of organizational
incentives and a participant’s motivational investment in
goods supplied by the organization and/or his ability to
attain these goods elsewhere can be summarized parsi-
moniously by the microeconomic notion of price elasticity. In
general, demand for a good is said to be inelastic when an
increase in the cost of that good is not matched by a pro-
portionate decrease in the number of buyers; demand is
defined as elastic when an increase in cost results in a dispro-
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portionate decrease in the number of buyers (Mansfield, 1970).
In the inelastic case, when participants cannot substitute
around or do without the inducement they receive from the
organization and when alternative sources of supply are
nonexistent, then an organization has a powerful incentive;
as the demands made on participants are increased dra-
matically, few participants will leave the organization. On
the other hand, where participants have access to the induce-
ments from other sources or if they can substitute for or do
without such goods, then an increase in the time effort
demanded by the organization will result in massive defections
by participants. ~ ~ I
For example, pure social movements that rely solely on
purposive incentives or organizations such as the Kiwanis
or Elks that rely on friendship to motivate effort generally
operate under the latter, elastic, condition, while families
or concentration camps find that they use an inelastic induct-
ment with few, rather imperfect substitutes and limited or
no alternative sources of supply. Thus, it can be seen that
the ratio between an increase in costs and the proportional
decrease in those who continue to work for the organization
is a parsimonious way of assessing the strength of collective
incentives.
SL1MMARY AND CONCLUSION
We have developed a property space for incentive analysis
using concepts related to the notion of utility. Our dimensions
have been negative and positive utilities, the relative likeli-
hood of incentive delivery, transferability, and the collective-
ness of goods. These were used to develop a typology for the
classification of incentives. The property space allows one to
see the similarity and difference between organizations
offering closely related incentives. It also provides a consistent
language for describing the dimensions of incentives.
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This language is useful when one seeks to combine the
findings of various disciplines. In general, it is peculiar that
analysts of organizational and political incentives and
compliance write with little attention to the ;ocial-psychol-
ogical and psychological underpinnings ot their concepts.
Moreover, they ignore price theory. Heuristically this is
justifiable, but it leads to a needless one-sidedness in their
work. For generations psychologists have worked upon
dimensions of incentives and economists have discussed the
conditions of elasticity. Organizational and political theorists
ought not cut themselves off from such traditions. Our analysis
provides a bridge.
At the beginning of this essay we noted that many scholars
have found it useful to use compliance/ incentive notions to
account for differences among major classes of organizations.
We believe they do so because incentives and incentive systems
are among the fundamental constitutional elements of
organizations (Zald, 1970). They are part of the bargain, the
social contract involved in joining, participating, and leaving
organizations. They shape other fundamental aspects of
organization, the internal stratification and authority system,
the range of usable technology and task differentiation, and
the effectiveness of organizational goal attainment. We
believe, then, that our effort here contributes to under-
standing a fundamental aspect of organizations.
NOTES
1. It is worth noting that 15 years have gone by since their original publications
in this area, and that both Etzioni (1975) and Wilson (1973) continue to use their
classifications. Yet neither takes into account the other’s classifications or modifies
his own toward the other’s. Wilson (1973: 52) notes the overlap with Etzioni but writes
that his focus is upon, voluntary associations, leading him to focus upon incentives
and inducements rather than on compliance. Etzioni (1975:91) only notes that Wilson
notes the overlap! 
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2. A property space can be either theoretically or empirically derived. Factor
analysis and cluster analysis are archetypical statistical methods for empirically
deriving underlying dimensions. Theoretical derivation proceeds by utilizing con-
ceptual distinctions and related dimensions as units of analysis related to some
theoretically defined object of analysis. Theoretical development of a property
space leads to type concepts that represent combinations of unitary dimensions. A
theoretically derived property space is successful if it reveals types that previous
classificatory schemas had ignored. Empirically, these types may rarely be matched.
Theoretically derived property spaces are also successful if by their introduction
of salient dimensions they separate and make distinctions within classes previously
considered homogeneous. See the writings of Bailey (1972, 1973) for the most recent
work on typology construction and their relationship to empirical analysis.
3. Analogies to money have been used by other scholars to analyze noneconomic
exchange. See Parsons (1963) on influence processes and Coleman(1970) on political
money.
4. Anyone interested in the difference between positive and negative sanctions
will find it worthwhile to read Baldwin’s incisive analysis.
5. Etzioni (1975: 27) notes that the forms of coercion in which he is interested
are dependent upon such boundary control.
6. This is the organizational delivery side of the concept of expected utility, which
decision theorists use in incorporating probability of payoff into individual choice
functions, See Siegel et al. (1964).
7. Paid staff in these associations receive high-probability incentives, while
other members, lower probability incentives.
8. We should note that transferability relates to other dimensions of incentives
that a finer-grained analysis might include. Pursuing the analogy to money, we would
separate from transferability (1) the alienability of incentives (the extent to which
they adhere to the recipient or are detachable); (2) their generalizability (the extent
to which the amount of utility is abstracted from the incentive); and (3) the divisibility
of incentives (the extent to which utility is infinitely divisible or must be delivered
in "lumpy" units). These dimensions overly complicate the present property space
and are therefore excluded. 
9. Wilson’s purposive organization and most of Etzioni’s "pure normative
organizations" are of these kinds (see Wilson, 1973: 35, 46; Etzioni, 1975: 10-11, 40-
41). Utility is gained through either identification with direct beneficiaries or through
the sense of moral or altruistic self worth that comes through the assuagement of
internalized values (see Kelman, 1958):
10. Olson’s analysis focuses only upon collective goods, those that must be
jointly supplied. The concept of collective goods should not be confused with ego’s
desires for alter’s benefit (altruism). Ego may value alter’s benefit as much as he values
his own. If the good will not be jointly supplied (in economic terms, has no exter-
nalities), there is no free-rider problem and either ego or alter must bear the cost of
obtaining it.
11. For an application of elasticity concepts to political commitment and choice,
see Strickland and Johnson (1970).
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